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Abstract—Design by Contract enables seamless software de-
velopment by unifying software requirements with their imple-
mentations. In its pure form, however, Design by Contract leaves
some problems with contracts’ expressiveness, verifiability, and
reusability open. These problems significantly reduce practical
applicability of seamless development. The present article intro-
duces seamless object-oriented requirements – a novel approach
to seamless development that builds upon Design by Contract
and now-available advanced program proving tools. The article
explains and illustrates the new approach, concluding with a
quantitative evaluation of the extent to which the approach fixes
the problems of traditional contracts.
Index Terms—seamless object-oriented requirements, seamless
development, Design by Contract, Eiffel, AutoProof, object-
oriented programming, program proving, formal verification
I. INTRODUCTION
Design by Contract (DbC [1]) made it possible to:
• Specify software requirements directly inside programs.
• Check correctness of the programs directly against the
specified requirements, both through testing [2] and pro-
gram proving [3].
Contracts are irreplaceable in how they document software
components. Figure 1 depicts EiffelStudio during the pro-
gramming process. More concretely, it depicts a situation in
which the programmer has just entered a dot symbol after
a variable and is looking for a feature to call. EiffelStudio
offers the list of features callable on the variable. Going
through the list causes the selected feature’s documentation to
appear in the rightmost pop-up window. It contains the natural
language description of the feature along with its semantics
in the form pre- and postconditions. The ability to see the
callable features’ meanings may significantly speed-up the
programming process.
DbC, while offering powerful mechanisms for specifying
and verifying object-oriented programs, fails to capture their
formal properties of certain forms:
• Multicommand abstract data type (ADT [4]) axioms,
such as pop (push (stack, element))= stack. Non-trivial ADT
specifications always include multicommand axioms [5],
and a program specification mechanism should be in
place for checking them.
• Temporal properties, such as (Stimulus ⇒ 3Response).
Some temporal properties of software were found to
follow certain patterns [6], [7] Some of these patterns
have complicated structures, making their application a
non-trivial task.
Addressing these problems requires an alternative specifica-
tion approach that would, at the same time, inherit the best
properties of contracts.
In addition to the generally insufficient expressiveness, con-
tracts may be weak. A program may be correct against a weak
contract and, at the same time, include incorrect instructions
that are not ruled out by the weak contract. Consider the
following Eiffel function for computing the square of the input
number:
square (x: INTEGER): INTEGER
do
-- Computing the square of x.
ensure
non_negative_result: Result ≥ 0
end
Clearly, the result should be non-negative. The
non_negative_result assertion, however, leaves room for
incorrect implementations: there are infinitely many non-
negative functions. A well-defined contract unambiguously
defines all the side-effects and return values of the enclosing
procedure. Specifying a contract’s well-definedness as part of
the contract itself seems to be unrealistic.
Contracts also miss support for reuse of recurring specifi-
cation patterns across conceptually unrelated data structures.
Consider the following procedure from a stack implementa-
tion:
push (element: G)
do
-- Pushing ‘element’ onto the current stack.
ensure
increments_count: count = old count + 1
end
Consider also the following procedure from a turnstile con-
troller implementation:
insert_coin
do
-- Handling coin insertion.
ensure
increments_coins: coins = old coins + 1
end
The increments_count and increments_coins assertions follow the
same common pattern: both increment the value of a class
attribute. Technically, DbC makes it possible to reuse contracts
from ancestor classes. Turnstiles, however, conceptually have
nothing in common with stacks, and inheriting them from
a common class would violate the object-oriented principles
[8]. DbC offers no mechanism other than inheritance to reuse
contracts with repeated fundamental semantics.
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Fig. 1: EiffelStudio displaying hints, including contracts and natural language comments.
II. THE UNIFIED SOLUTION
Our approach relies on the following fundamental principles
to fix the problems with contracts:
• Use the imperative subset of the programming language
for specifications, not only the declarative contracts.
• Use loops equipped with loop invariants and variants for
specifying temporal and timing properties.
• Use Hoare logic based static program proving to infer
correct contracts from axiomatically correct implementa-
tions.
• Use object-oriented genericity and abstraction to make
software requirements universally reusable.
Methodologically, object-oriented software construction [8]
becomes the requirements specification method, and DbC
[1] empowered with the static program prover becomes the
requirements verification method.
A. The choice of notation and technology
We chose Eiffel as the representative language to illustrate
our concepts. It has human-friendly syntax, natively supports
contracts and builds around object-oriented concepts. An ad-
vanced technology stack accompanies Eiffel. AutoProof, the
contracts-based modular program prover [3], allowed us to
work at the cutting edge of the programming technology.
It has been playing a key role in our studies. AutoProof is
a program prover based on Hoare logic [9] extended with
semantic collaboration [10] – reasoning framework that covers
phenomena specific to object-oriented programming, such as
aliasing, callbacks and information hiding. Polikarpova et al.
demonstrated practical applicability of AutoProof by using it
to fully verify EiffelBase2 – a specified library of containers
[11]. We have been using EiffelBase2 extensively as a valuable
source of data for testing our ideas.
B. Imperative instructions for software requirements
Design by Contract [1] was originally designed under the
assumption that the contracts would be checked at run time.
Practitioners were perceiving code solely as an executable
artifact. AutoProof makes it possible to use program elements
as statically verifiable statements that may never be executed.
This possibility has been the main thinking vehicle driving the
development of the thesis.
Specification drivers operationalize this possibility. The ar-
ticle describes several novel concepts, among which the notion
of specification driver is the most fundamental. Understanding
this concept is essential for understanding the rest of the
work: the other concepts build on top of specification drivers.
Syntactically, a specification driver is an object-oriented Hoare
triple, or a self-contained contracted routine. The following
specification driver formally captures the multicommand stack
axiom mentioned in Section I:
push_then_pop (s_1, s_2: STACK [G]; x: G)
-- pop (push (s, x)) = s
-- Popping a stack after pushing an element on it
-- results in the original stack, assuming that
-- these operations only modify the stack itself.
require
s_1 ~ s_2
modify
s_1
do
s_1.push (x)
s_1.pop
ensure
s_1 ~ s_2
end
The natural language comment captures the axiom’s
mathematical representation and informal description. The
push_then_pop routine depends only on its formal parameter and
is self-contained in that sense. The routine may be submitted
for static verification to AutoProof. AutoProof can only rely
on contracts of the supplier classes for verification. Hence, it
will only accept the push_then_pop routine if the contracts of
push and pop are correct. We treat the push_then_pop routine,
as well as any other specification driver, as an axiomatically
correct code, and infer correct contracts from these axiomatic
definitions. The modify clause captures the frame condition,
critical for static verification. The require and ensure clauses
capture the routine’s pre- and postcondition, respectively.
Definition 2.1: A specification driver is a self-contained
contracted routine that captures some behavioral property of
its formal parameters through the contract.
A separate work [12] gives more intuition behind specifica-
tion drivers and how to apply them in the presence of a pro-
gram prover like AutoProof. The subsequent sections develop
this idea further and find for it more complex applications –
way more complex than specification and verification of stack.
Specification drivers:
• Capture temporal properties and timing constraints in
addition to ADT axioms.
• Capture contracts’ well-definedness axioms for checking
with AutoProof.
• Capture repeated requirements’ formal semantics in a
reusable form.
The remaining sections expand, detail and illustrate these
benefits of specification drivers. The article concludes with
the generalized object-oriented treatment of requirements with
specification drivers serving as the verification mechanism.
They became the main thinking vehicle taking us to the general
notions of seamless object-oriented requirement (SOOR) and
SOOR template (SOORT).
C. Loops for temporal properties
While ADT axioms are good at capturing properties of soft-
ware components, requirements to control software are mainly
specified as temporal properties [6]. Specification drivers ap-
peared to be applicable not only to capturing multicommand
ADT axioms, but also to capturing temporal properties. The
popping_empties_stack procedure below formally specifies the
temporal property written as a natural language comment
inside the procedure:
popping_empties_stack (s: V_STACK [INTEGER])
-- Repeatedly popping a non-empty stack will
-- make it empty within s.count steps.
require
stimulus: not s.is_empty
modify
s
do
from
until
s.is_empty
loop
s.pop
variant
s.count
end
end
The require precondition clause characterizes the situation to
which the requirement applies: the stack must not be empty.
The until loop exit condition expresses the desired property of
the requirement. The variant clause limits the maximum num-
ber of iterations to s.count, according to the limitation stated
in the requirement. The loop body between the loop and the
variant keywords applies the pop operation constrained by the
requirement. Applying the Eiffel plus AutoProof combination
for specifying and verifying temporal properties resulted in
finding a major flaw in a published executable specification of
a landing gear system [13].
D. Genericity and abstraction for reusable requirements
Dwyer et al. [6] analyzed 555 temporal control software
requirements and successfully mapped 511 of them to only
23 temporal SRPs. The popping_empties_stack example from
Section II-C represents an example of the most widespread
temporal SRP, which covered 241 requirements out of the
555 analyzed in [6]. Specification drivers, together with the
standard object-oriented genericity mechanism, successfully
capture such repeated SRPs. The STIMULUS_RESPONSE deferred
class below captures the popular SRP followed by the
popping_empties_stack example:
deferred class STIMULUS_RESPONSE [S]
-- Deferred definitions start here.
stimulus (s: S): BOOLEAN
deferred
end
response (s: S): BOOLEAN
deferred
end
verification_timer (s: S): INTEGER
deferred
end
action (s: S)
deferred
end
-- Deferred definitions end here.
-- Reusable semantics starts here.
verify (s: S)
require
stimulus (s)
modify
s
do
from
until
response (s)
loop
action (s)
variant
verification_timer (s)
end
ensure
response (s)
end
-- Reusable semantics ends here.
end
We call such classes seamless object-oriented requirement
templates (or SOORTs). The POPPING_EMPTIES_STACK class below
instantiates the STIMULUS_RESPONSE SOORT and captures the
same property as the popping_empties_stack specification driver
from Section II-C:
class POPPING_EMPTIES_STACK [G]
inherit STIMULUS_RESPONSE [STACK [G]]
stimulus (s: STACK [G]]): BOOLEAN
do
Result := not s.is_empty
end
response (s: STACK [G]]): BOOLEAN
do
Result := s.is_empty
end
verification_timer (s: STACK [G]]): INTEGER
do
Result := s.count
end
action (s: STACK [G]])
do
s.pop
end
end
We call such classes seamless object-oriented requirements
(or SOORs). Two main features make specifying temporal
properties through SOOR(T)s better than doing it through
plain specification drivers:
• SOORTs apply to arbitrary data types.
• SOORs do not need to explicitly state the potentially
tricky temporal semantics; they simply inherit it from
the parent SOORT in the form of the verify specification
driver.
We have successfully specified all the 23 recurring temporal
SRPs in the form of SOORTs [14]. While the complexity of
the original temporal SRPs varies significantly, the complexity
of SOORs inheriting from our SOORTs remains at the same
level. In a recent work [14] we polish the notions of SOORs
and SOORTs to the level at which the specification of resulting
SOORs relies purely on inheritance.
E. Well-definedness of contracts
Specification drivers enable proof-based reasoning
about well-definedness of individual features. The
push_is_well_defined procedure below specifies the well-
definedness property for the push procedure from type
STACK [G], where G is a generic type parameter coming from
the enclosing class’ declaration:
push_is_well_defined (s1, s2: STACK [G]; x: G)
-- Whenever two stack instances are equal, they should
-- remain equal after being called in identical ways.
require
s1.is_equal (s2)
modify
s1, s2
do
s1.push (x)
s2.push (x)
ensure
s1.is_equal (s2)
end
The program prover, AutoProof in our case, will only accept
the push_is_well_defined procedure if the contract of the push
procedure is well-defined with respect to the definition of
equality, is_equal. We separately handle the nuances of spec-
ifying the equivalence relation in the original work devoted
to the early idea of specification drivers [12]. Applying well-
definedness specification drivers to EiffelBase2, a fully verified
container library [11], uncovered numerous features with weak
contracts. Section III details these findings.
F. Key activities
Several major activities characterize our approach.
1) Developing a SOORT: Developing a SOORT requires
the same skills as developing any other object-oriented class.
It assumes identification of an SRP, hardcoding its immutable
part and parameterizing its variable part through abstraction
and genericity.
1) Identify the SRP’s formal semantics.
2) Declare the SOORT class and name it to reflect the
identified semantics.
3) Encode the identified semantics through specification
drivers and put them inside the SOORT class.
4) Make the specification drivers work with generic, not
actual types; make the generic types part of the enclosing
SOORT’s declaration.
A separate work [14] provides more technical details to help
developing new SOORTs.
2) Instantiating a SOORT into a SOOR: Converting an
input requirement to a SOOR assumes identifying an SRP that
cover the requirement, inheriting from the SOORT capturing
the identified SRP, and implementing the SOORT’s deferred
definitions parts. The resulting SOOR class must be fully
defined.
1) Find the SOORT encoding the identified semantics.
2) Create a concrete class inheriting from the found
SOORT.
3) Replace the SOORT’s formal generic parameters with
actual generic parameters.
4) Implement the SOORT’s deferred features.
5) Make sure that the newly implemented SOOR success-
fully compiles.
3) Verifying through program proving: Proving correctness
of a candidate implementation against a SOOR consists of
running AutoProof on the SOOR. In this case, AutoProof will
check correctness of the SOOR’s specification drivers against
the candidate solution’s contracts. This may require writing
additional annotations on the specification drivers that capture
the SOOR’s formal semantics.
1) Run AutoProof on the SOOR.
2) If AutoProof rejects the input, fix the implementation
contract; go to step 1.
3) If AutoProof accepts the input, consider the implemen-
tation contract correct.
4) Implement the derived contract and check the implemen-
tation’s correctness with AutoProof.
III. QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION
The present section discusses quantitative arguments show-
ing that SOORs promote expressiveness, contracts’ well-
definedness, and reusability.
A. Expressiveness
The evidence of the SOORTs’ expressiveness comes from
the possibility to capture:
• The 23 temporal SRPs for control software [14].
• The repeated real-time semantics [7], through the stan-
dard notion of loop variants.
• The 21 ADT specifications recurring in the requirements
literature [14].
Some of the control software SRPs have tricky formal
semantics. For example, the “Bounded Existence Between Q
and R” SRP, where the bound is at most 2 designated states,
looks as follows in LTL:
((Q ∧3R)⇒ ((¬ P ∧ ¬ R)U(R ∨ ((P ∧ ¬ R)U(R ∨
((¬ P ∧ ¬ R)U(R ∨ ((P ∧ ¬ R)U(R ∨ (¬ PUR)))))
(1)
We were able to encode this formula as the verify specification
driver inside the BOUNDED_EXISTENCE_BETWEEN class. Moreover,
representing requirements’ formal semantics as specification
drivers allows us to generalize from the 2-states to the k-states
case. Three out of the five notations used by Dwyer et al. –
LTL, CTL and GIL – lack expressiveness for performing such
generalization. Using the programming language as a require-
ments notation makes it possible to perform the generalization
through enclosing the bounded existence semantics into an
additional loop that runs exactly k times.
B. Well-definedness of contracts
We have evaluated the usefulness of specification drivers for
analyzing contracts’ well-definedness. The EiffelBase2 library
[11] seems to be a perfect data set for such evaluation –
its authors claim well-definedness of all the contracts in this
library. We analyzed well-definedness of feature copy_ in the
EiffelBase2 classes. The feature copies the given object into
the current one. Out of the 17 versions of the feature, 6 were
underspecified. They come from the following classes:
• V_ARRAY2
• V_LINKED_QUEUE
• V_LINKED_STACK
• V_ARRAYED_LIST_ITERATOR
• V_ARRAY_ITERATOR
• V_HASH_SET_ITERATOR
Deeper analysis revealed that the most common problem
was not taking into consideration the possibility of alias-
ing between the copied and the current objects. For the
V_HASH_SET_ITERATOR class, however, AutoProof did not accept
the well-definedness axiom even with the aliasing prohibited in
the precondition. AutoProof did not terminate when checking
the well-definedness axiom for the following 2 classes:
• V_DOUBLY_LINKED_LIST_ITERATOR
• V_LINKED_LIST_ITERATOR
The non-termination may be interpreted as if the features were
underdefined. Summarizing the results of the analysis, out
of the 17 versions AutoProof accepted the well-definedness
axiom only for 9. Underdefined contracts may have security
implications. Consider appending the following code to the
implementation of feature copy_ in class V_ARRAY2:
else
array.wipe_out
row_count := 0
column_count := 0
end
The else clause describes the aliasing situation, which is
ignored in the contract of the feature. The added code wipes
out the current array’s data. AutoProof accepts the modified
implementation, which is not what we expect: a feature
responsible for copying from another array should not erase
the current one. The published presentation of EiffelBase2
claims well-definedness of the flawed classes [11].
The EiffelBase2 library contains software components. As
for control software, expressing their properties as specifica-
tion drivers was also fruitful. A separate work [13] details un-
covering an error in a published abstract state machine (ASM)
implementation [15] of the Landing Gear System (LGS) [16]
– a commonly used example for evaluating applicability of
formal specification and verification techniques.
C. Reusability
We might evaluate the extent to which our approach im-
proves reusability by following a commonly accepted practice
– measuring the amount of duplication removed from require-
ments [17]. Such evaluation would make little sense, however:
the SOOR approach just applies the object-oriented principles
to the construction of requirements. This makes the evaluation
straightforward: the amount of duplication may be removed
completely – this is exactly what happens to software built
around the same principles. We prefer then to evaluate the
extent to which the reuse approach simplifies specification of
individual requirements.
Recall the “Bounded Existence Between Q and R” SRP
(Equation 1). Repeatedly instantiating and verifying this SRP
as it is may be a challenging and error-prone process. In
our approach, the complexity of specifying a SOOR does not
depend on the SOORT’s internal complexity. For example,
a SOOR expressing requirement “equinox happens not more
than two times during a year” for a calendar system would
roughly look as follows:
class
EQUINOX_FREQUENCY
inherit
BOUNDED_EXISTENCE_BETWEEN [CALENDAR, EQUINOX, YEAR_BEGINNING,
YEAR_END]
CALENDAR _REQUIREMENT
end
where: class CALENDAR represents the specified type; EQUINOX
captures the equinox condition; YEAR_BEGINNING and YEAR_END
capture the beginning and the end of the year, respectively;
CALENDAR_REQUIREMENT captures phenomena common to calendar
requirements. Consider now requirement “the beginning of
the year is always followed by the end of the year”. This
requirement represents the “Global Response” SRP, in LTL:
(P ⇒ 3S)
The complexity of this SRP is incomparably smaller than the
complexity of the previous one. The SOOR capturing the new
requirement would look as follows:
class
YEAR_END_RESPONDS_TO_YEAR_BEGINNING
inherit
RESPONSE_GLOBAL [CALENDAR, YEAR_END, YEAR_BEGINNING]
CALENDAR _REQUIREMENT
end
This SOOR is simpler only in one way: it provides 3 actual
generic parameters to its SOORT, while the previous one
provides 4. We may say that the SOOR’s complexity depends
linearly on the number of formal generic parameters in the
SOORT from which the SOOR inherits. For the existing
control software SRP’s, however, this number never exceeds
4.
As for specifying SOORs for software components from
the ADT SOORTs: the number of ADT axioms depends
quadratically on the number of operations in the specified ADT
[5]. Specifying a SOOR from an ADT SOORT requires only to
connect the deferred features of the SOORT with the concrete
features of the specified type. This does not remove the need to
verify all the ADT axioms present in the SOORT in the form
of specification drivers. The AutoProof technology solves the
verification problem. The approach replaces the specification
complexity from quadratic to linear.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Our approach further removes the notational gap between
software requirements and their implementations, following
the key idea of DbC. The approach makes software require-
ments:
• Expressive, thanks to the expressive power of an object-
oriented programming language with contracts.
• Well-defined (when they take the traditional form of con-
tracts), thanks to specification drivers and the powerful
verification tool.
• Reusable, thanks to the standard object-oriented tech-
niques – genericity and abstraction.
Quantitative (Section III) arguments show the improvements
in expressiveness, verifiability and reusability of the resulting
requirements.
V. FUTURE WORK
The following work is necessary to demonstrate the benefits
of our approach in an even more convincing way:
• Applying and measuring the approach in an industrial
setting.
• Proving formally that the presented library of seamless
requirement templates correctly resembles the encoded
SRPs’ semantics.
The present work opens the following research directions:
• Automatic generation of SOORTs in a given program-
ming language from a given pattern expressed in some
mathematical formalism.
• Extending the existing IDEs for better support of seam-
less requirements and their templates.
• AI-based detection of patterns in natural language re-
quirements with their subsequent translation to SOORTs.
• Identifying new patterns in recurring requirements that
do not map to existing patterns.
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